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INTRODUCTION
n December of 1994, the European Union ("E.U.") enacted a Di-
rective establishing standards for recovering and recycling pack-
aging waste.' Member States will soon have to pass national legis-
lation "harmonizing" their existing national laws with this Direc-
tive.2 Some of these States, including Germany, France, and The
Netherlands, already have national packaging waste laws. But those
laws establish target rates for recovering and recycling packaging
waste well above the Community-wide standards adopted in the
new E.U. Directive. The German government, in particular, has
complained that compliance with the Directive will compromise
national environmental quality by imposing lower standards.3
This complaint has become a familiar one in recent years.4 Just
two years ago, American environmentalists, among others, voiced a
similar refrain when the Senate approved the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") with Mexico.' The new trade re-
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Indiana School of Law at Indianapolis. The author
is also a graduate student at the Indiana University School of Public and Envi-
ronmental Affairs. She would like to thank Daniel H. Cole for his invaluable
advice and commentary and Mary and Stephen Comer for infinite patience
throughout the preparation of this Note.
1. Council Directive No. 94/62/EC of December 20, 1994, published in the
Official Journal of the European Communities on December 20, 1994 at O.J. L
365/10, 12-31-94.
2. For information on harmonization requirements and procedures, see infra
part II.B.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment De-
bate: In Search of a Neutral Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1279, 1281-82 (1992).
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gime, they argued, could be used to force the United States to
reduce its environmental standards.6 Increasingly, international
environmental laws and international trade regimes have limited the
power of participating governments to set stringent standards for
environmental protection; in doing so, they have limited sovereign
discretion to select a level of national environmental quality.7 But
there is another side to this issue, which has received little atten-
tion.
National environmental policies can impact on environmental
quality far beyond national borders. Particularly stringent environ-
mental standards in one country can result in the export of pollution
problems to others.8 This raises a fairness issue. Specifically, can
one country justifiably seek to improve environmental quality at the
expense of another?
This is the question at the heart of the debate over the waste
packaging regulation in the E.U. Germany's Waste Packaging Ordi-
nance has reduced the amount of waste transported to German
landfills and, thereby, contributed to improved environmental quali-
ty in Germany.9 At the same time, the economic incentives created
by the German Packaging Waste Ordinance have resulted in mass
exports of German waste to other E.U. Member Countries and non-
member countries in Central and Eastern Europe.'0 But now, the
E.U.'s new Waste Packaging Directive may require Germany and
other countries to relax their targets for waste recovery and recy-
cling." This may result in some negative environmental impact in
Germany-although there is even reason to doubt this. More im-
portantly, it will contribute to improved environmental quality
throughout the Union and beyond its borders in the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe by reducing the incentive German
companies have under currently stringent national standards to
export their waste.
Section I of this Note provides a theoretical framework for feder-
6. See id. at 1292-94.
7. See id. at 1290-94.
8. See id. at 1292.
9. See infra part IV.
10. See infra part IV.
11. See infra part IV.
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alism in environmental protection and presents the American feder-
al experience with environmental standards. Section II explicates
the quasi-federal structure of the E.U., based on the principles of
subsidiarity, proportionality, and harmonization. Section III supplies
a brief history of environmental legislation in the Union. That histo-
ry demonstrates how previous E.U. directives have contributed to
improved Union-wide environmental quality, despite the fact that,
in some cases, they imposed upside limits on national environmen-
tal standards. Section IV contains the case study of the E.U.'s new
Waste Packaging Directive, focusing on its relation to existing
national legislation in Germany, France, and The Netherlands. Fi-
nally, Section V draws implications from the analysis, and con-
cludes that regional environmental standards requiring Member
States to relax national standards may, at least in some cases, be
both justified and necessary to prevent the export of environmental
problems. They can result-and have resulted-in improved envi-
ronmental quality on the regional level.
I. FEDERALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
Environmental protection and pollution control were originally
believed to be local issues. 2 It was thought that pollution was best
addressed where it was generated. 3 Pollution carried away by
wind or water, however, left the generating state little incentive to
control the damage. 4 Consequently, some states were lax in their
regulatory efforts."i
Environmental pollution does not recognize political borders; a
state can suffer from pollution generated by its neighbors. Govern-
ments that choose to adopt strict regulations can see their efforts
minimized by nearby nations with low standards or poor enforce-
ment. 6 Without regional standards, the quality of the environment
in a progressive state or country can be degraded by political enti-
12. See ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 103
(Robert Percival et al., eds., 1992).
13. See id. at 73-77.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 103.
16. See id. at 116-26. See also Goldman, supra note 5, at 1292.
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ties with little or no commitment to the environment. 7 This is evi-
denced by the American federal experience with pollution control.
The earliest federal environmental programs in the United States
were based upon the premise that environmental issues were a local
responsibility. 8 The federal environmental laws in the 1960s,
which were the precursors to the current comprehensive laws, re-
mained primarily non-regulatory.' 9 However, the federal role in
environmental policy changed dramatically in the 1970s, as expand-
ing economic activity revealed the interstate character of pollu-
tion."
The federalization of environmental policy resulted from recogni-
tion that state and local governments lacked the resources and the
political will to control pollution problems that were becoming
national in scope." The start of the modem federalization of envi-
ronmental law began symbolically with the first Earth Day on April
22, 1970. In that year, the Clean Air Act was adopted and, soon
after, a rapid succession of major pollution control laws.22
The growth of modem environmental regulations has been largely
driven by federal legislation. Although the environment is an area
in which the federal government shares competency with the states,
the Congress clearly has the power to preempt state law in environ-
mental policy, though states maintain power to address environmen-
tal issues.23 Most federal environmental laws are implemented and
enforced at the state level.24 Federal legislation often specifies
minimum standards that must be met, but allows the establishment
of more stringent pollution control measures by the states.25 States
also maintain the primary authority to regulate environmental prob-
lems that are still considered local issues.26
The federalization of environmental policy in the United States,
17. See id. at 118.
18. See id. at 104-20.
19. See id. at 104-06.
20. See id. at 106-12.
21. See id. at 106.
22. Id. at 109-10.
23. Id. at 113, 116-17.
24. Id. at 117.
25. Id. at 118.
26. See id. at 117.
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especially the air pollution control legislation, has been a suc-
cess." Emissions of most air pollutants have fallen in the decades
since the Clean Air Act was adopted in 1970. The Statistical Re-
cord of the Environment reported the decrease in emissions levels
from the years 1940 to 1987. Emission data are shown in Table 1
below.28
Table 1
Air Pollution Emissions 1940-1987
1940 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
PM 23.1 24.9 21.6 18.5 10.6 8.5 8.0 7.1 7.1 7.4 7.0 6.8 7.0
SOx 17.6 19.8 19.7 28.3 25.8 23.4 22.6 21.4 20.7 21.5 21.1 20.7 20.4
NOx 6.8 9.3 12.8 18.3 19.2 20.4 20.4 19.6 19.0 19.7 19.8 19.3 19.5
VOC 18.1 20.2 22.6 26.2 22.1 22.3 21.0 19.7 20.4 21.5 20.1 19.3 19.6
CO 81.5 86.1 88.1 100.2 82.2 77.0 74.4 69.4 71.3 68.7 64.6 61.6 61.4
Pb (NA) (NA) (NA) 203.8 147.0 70.6 55.9 54.4 46.3 40.1 21.1 8.6 8.1
Measurements in millions of metric tons, except lead measured in thousands of metric tons.
PM=particulate matter, SOx=sulfur oxides, NOx=nitrous oxides, VOC=volatile organic
compounds, CO=carbon monoxide, Pb=lead.
Air quality in the United States has also improved. For the years
1979 through 1988, lead concentrations in the air fell by 89 per-
cent, carbon monoxide levels declined by 28 percent, and sulfur
dioxide levels fell by about 30 percent. Tangible improvements
were also seen in the levels of particulate matter in the air and
nitrogen dioxide.29
These improvements in air quality are particularly impressive
considering the growth of the U.S. population and economy over
the same period of time. Between 1970 and 1990, the U.S. popula-
tion grew by approximately 25 percent, and economic activity near-
ly doubled.30
Although not as dramatic as the air quality improvements, water
quality has also shown improvement since the Clean Water Act was
adopted." Some lakes have shown a continued decline in quality,
27. Id.
28. STATISTICAL RECORD OF THE ENVIRONMENT 59 tbl. 66 (Arsen J. Darnay,
ed., 1992). Particulate levels fell about 21% and nitrogen dioxide levels fell by
12%.
29. Id. at 1, tbl. 1.
30. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s 20 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E.
Kraft, eds., 1994). Economic activity is estimated adjusted for inflation.
31. Id. at 21.
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but most lakes, rivers, and streams have maintained their quality in
spite of great economic growth.32 Many water bodies have shown
improvement, and a few have been remarkably restored.33
One source even supports the proposition that water quality is
generally being maintained or is even improving.34 Table 2 lists
the type of water body and its change in condition in the decade
between 1972 and 1982.35
Table 2
Changes in Surface Water Quality in the United States, 1972 to 1982
Water Quality River & Streams Lakes Estuaries
Status (1000s of miles) (millions of acres) (1000s of sq. miles)
Maintained 296.00 10.13 12.80
Improved 47.00 0.39 3.80
Degraded 11.00 1.65 0.56
Unknown 90.00 4.15 0.17
The federal system of environmental laws in the U.S. has suc-
cessfully addressed problems that state governments were unable to
adequately control. Improvements in the quality of the local envi-
ronment have been realized since the federal government preempted
the states' power to exclusively control their own environmental
policies. Although some may state that the federalization of the
American environmental laws may be viewed as an encroachment
upon the sovereign powers of the states,36 the result has been a
cleaner and healthier environment for the states,37 because federal
environmental laws have never forced states to reduce existing
standards, and they have only rarely prohibited states from enacting
more stringent standards. 3' Thus, improved environmental quality
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. THE WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA 499 tbl. 7-6 (Frits van der Leeden et al., eds.,
1990).
36. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN THE 1990s, supra note 30.
37. This is not to imply that federal environmental laws in the U.S. have
solved all environmental problems. Some issues remain inadequately addressed,
e.g., toxic air and water pollutants. Id. at 21.
38. One example of federal legislation that prohibited states from enacting
more stringent standards than the federal standards was the Clean Air Act before
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in the United States rarely came at the expense of local and state
authority.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union is an important regime in the study of trade
and the environment. The area is densely populated, heavily pollut-
ed, and highly industrialized. The economic tie binding its diverse
Member Countries prompted the development of an environmental
agenda. 9 Conversely, the emergence of a common environmental
policy has contributed to the growth of the European Union as a
political system.'
A. The History and Structure of the European Union
The European Union has its beginnings as an economic customs
union.41 In the early 1950s, politicians sought to rebuild the Euro-
pean prosperity torn by war and to encourage future peace by
building an area of common trade.42 Although rooted in the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community of 1951 and the 1957 European
Atomic Energy Community, it began formally with the creation of
the 1990 amendments. That Act preempted more stringent state vehicle emissions
standards except for the standards already existing in California which were
stricter than the federal standards promulgated in the 1970 Clean Air Act. The
1990 Amendments, however, authorized other states to adopt the California stan-
dards. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY, supra note
12, at 844.
39. The first explicit references to Community powers in the field of environ-
mental protection came on July 1, 1987, when the SEA amending the Treaties
went into force. "Article 100a la[id] down criteria for environmental protection
legislation affecting the internal market and allow[ed] legislation to be adopted by
qualified majority in the Council. Aricles 130r, 130s, and 130t la[id] down the
goals, means and procedures for the adoption of legislation regarding the environ-
ment, but by unanimous decision." 2 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TIES, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL XI, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT LEGIs-
LATION, xii (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities,
1992).
40. Id. at xi.
41. See 1951 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
and the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. Id. at
xi n.1.
42. See id. at xii.
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the European Economic Community in the 1957 Treaty of Rome
("Treaty"). 43
The six original signatory nations, Belgium, France, Italy, Lux-
embourg, The Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany,
joined together on January 1, 1958 to form the European Economic
Community. Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Ireland joined in
1973, and Greece, Spain, and Portugal were admitted in the
1980s.44 Austria, Finland, and Sweden were recently admitted and
became members on January 1, 1995, bringing the present total to
fifteen Member States in the European Union.45
The purpose of the Treaty was to create a common economic
market by facilitating the free circulation of goods, services, per-
sons, and capital.' The Treaty was later amended by the Single
European Act in 1987 and the Treaty on Political Union signed in
Maastricht in 1991.' In 1975, the European Parliament resolved to
use the term "European Community" to refer to the supranational
political entity that had emerged, acknowledging the broader range
of issues the Community would address.' 8 The reference to the
European Union resulted from the Maastricht Treaty reflecting the
goal of a single union without national borders.49
From its beginnings as a purely economic customs union, it has
evolved into a community with legal and political dimensions.
Although the European Union is not a "United States of Europe," it
is a quasi-federal system with the Community and Member States
having dual power.50 Areas of exclusive competency are constitu-
43. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [hereinafter
"Treaty of Rome"] along with the 1951 Treaty Establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community and the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community constitute the European Community. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
ENVIRONMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 39, at xi n. 1.
44. Id. at xi.
45. Council Agrees on PCB Phase Out, Packaging Recycling, Hazardous
Waste List, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 4-5 (Jan. 11, 1995).
46. ECKARD REHBINDER & RICHARD STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION POLICY 15 (1985).
47. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 39, at
Xii, Xiii.
48. Id. at xi n.2.
49. Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union,
18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 616 n.1 (1994).
50. Some E.U. citizens object that the Union is not a true federal system, as it
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tionally delegated to the Union and some areas are reserved to the
States." The power to legislate most issues, however, is shared
between the E.C. and the Member States. In the areas of shared
competency, action may be taken at both the Community and na-
tional level.52 All States have agreed upon the supremacy of Com-
munity law. Therefore, when the Community acts it preempts legis-
lation at the State level.53
The Community has three branches, an executive, a legislative,
and a judiciary branch.54 The Commission of the European Com-
munities is the executive branch with the power to propose legisla-
tion.55 It is organized into 23 directorates-general, including the
Directorate-General XI which covers the environment, nuclear
safety, and civil protection. 6 The Commission is also responsible
for the implementation and enforcement of Community environ-
mental legislation.57 The Council of Ministers is the legislative
branch of the Community with the primary power to adopt legisla-
tion. The Council is comprised of one governmental representative
exists in Germany or the United States. Among other things, they note, the Euro-
pean Union can sign, but cannot make treaties binding on its members. Also, its
directives are not directly binding on Member States, but require nationally enact-
ed implementing legislation. At the same time, it is clear that E.U. directives
function much like federal legislation, ultimately requiring Member States to
comply with Union standards. In addition, the Union can issue "regulations"
which, unlike directives, are directly binding on Member States. In other words,
even if the European Union is not structured like typical federal systems, it often
acts like one. For a detailed comparison of the American federal system and the
European Union, see Thomas C. Fischer, Federalism in the European Community
and the United States: A Rose by any other Name ... , 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
389 (1994).
51. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 39, at
xiii.
52. See id. at xiv.
53. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 349
(1994).
54. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 39, at
xii.
55. Id. at xv.
56. Id.
57. Id. at xv-xvi.
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from each of the Member States, usually at the ministerial level. 8
The European Court of Justice ("Court") ensures that treaties and
the Community laws are respected by the Member States. Judges
on the Court are appointed by agreement among the Member
States. The Court generally does not have the power to impose
sanctions, but the Member States are required to comply with its
rulings.5 9
The last entity of the European Union is the Parliament, a quasi-
legislative branch of the supranational government that represents
the interests of the citizens of the Community.' Parliamentary
representatives are directly elected by voters in the Member States
and are required to set aside their national allegiances to represent
the interests of the citizens of the Community.6 Although the Par-
liament is persuasive, it is not a true legislature because it cannot
initiate or adopt legislation, but may only influence policy forma-
tion."
Legislation may be adopted as either a directive or regulation. 3
Regulations are self-implementing and are binding on the Member
States.6 Directives, however, must be implemented by the Mem-
ber States.65 Directives set "broad objectives" and the individual
Member State governments must adopt legislation necessary to
incorporate the Community law or to bring the national law into
compliance with the directive's provisions.'
The Treaty of Rome provisions determine which instruments are
used for the adoption of Community laws.67 They do not, howev-
58. Id. at xvi.
59. Id. at xix.
60. Id. at xvii.
61. Id. at xv.
62. Id. at xvii. "The Parliament did, however, acquire a formal role in adopt-
ing legislation when the Single European Act introduced the cooperation proce-
dure." Id.
63. Thomas R. Mounteer, Proposed European Directive for Damage to the
Environment Caused by Waste, 23 ENVTL. L. 107, 113 (1993).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the
European Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
846, 867 (1994).
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er, specify which instrument must be used for Community regula-
tion of environmental issues. Therefore, both regulations and direc-
tives have been used in Community actions involving air and water
pollution legislation.6"
B. Limits on the Power to Harmonize: Subsidiarity,
Proportionality
The E.U.'s power to harmonize divergent laws among Member
States is the cornerstone of the Community's federal powers. The
E.C. treaties recognize that the goal of a free market may be ham-
pered not only by national legislation that directly regulates the free
movement of goods, but also by wide divergences in health, safety,
and environmental legislation among the Member States.69
In order to address the impact of differing national laws, the E.C.
adopted Article 100, authorizing the Council to enact directives to
harmonize such laws.7" Article 100, however, requires unanimous
approval before a directive can be adopted.
Although not specifically addressed in the earlier Treaties, envi-
ronmental issues were legislated under the harmonization provisions
of Article 100. The adopted measures established product standards
and technical rules regulating emissions intended to eliminate trade
barriers by setting Community-wide standards. Although many
important steps were taken, adopting tight standards for the protec-
tion of the environment was not the focus of the early environmen-
tal directives.7
As the economic barriers between member countries were slowly
dismantled, the E.C. began to focus its attention on non-economic
policies.72 The shifting focus from protecting the free market to
protecting the environment helped to reveal the weakness of the
earlier Treaties' unanimous vote requirement.73 The necessity of a
68. Id.
69. Jochen Taupitz, The German Environmental Liability Law of 1990: Con-
tinuing Problems and the Impact of European Regulation, 19 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & COMM. 13, 32 (1993).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 33.
72. Id. at 32.
73. Id.
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unanimous vote made the process of adopting strict environmental
legislation difficult and resulted in States negotiating weak provi-
sions in order to pass legislation.74
The adoption of the Single European Act of 1986 ("SEA") facili-
tated the environmental activities of the Union.75 The SEA ex-
pressly addressed environmental legislation in Title VII, Articles
130(r)-130(t) 76 of which represents environmental protection and
management as a legislative objective in its own right. In addition,
the SEA also eliminated the unanimous vote requirement for har-
monizing legislation. The new Article 100(a) allowed the adoption
of harmonizing legislation by a qualified majority.77
The qualified majority system allows votes to be weighted on the
basis of a Member State's size and economic importance.78 Under
the system, the largest Member States, including Germany, are
given ten votes.79 A qualified majority requires fifty-four votes for
legislation. to pass. 0 This system allows the impasse of a single
Member Country's objection to be avoided in the development of
environmental legislation.8"
The goal of the Union is harmonization and not unification of
laws. 2 By imposing higher national standards, Article 130(t)83 al-
lows Member States to maintain more stringent measures than those
provided by E.C. legislation. However, this power to impose higher
national standards is qualified by the requirement that national
environmental laws be compatible with the Act and not hinder the
free movement of goods.84 Higher national standards are subject to
review by the Commission, may not be arbitrarily discriminatory
74. See, e.g., Konrad von Moltke, A European Perspective on Trade and the
Environment, in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 93, 103 (Durwood Zaelke et al.,
eds., 1993).
75. Id. at 103.
76. Taupitz, supra note 69, at 33.
77. Id.
78. Id. at n.70.
79. Id.
80. ld.
81. Id. at 33.
82. Fischer, supra note 50, at 398 n.26.
83. Treaty of Rome, supra note 43.
84. Rehbinder & Stewart, supra note 46, at 59.
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and cannot have adverse effects disproportionate to the pursued
objectives.85 Furthermore, the standards must be necessary to
achieve environmental objectives and must use the least restrictive
means in regulating the free movement of goods.86
1. The Subsidiarity Principle
One of the issues in the development of the environmental agen-
da in the Community is whether the enactment of environmental
legislation should ultimately be an exercise of power by the Mem-
ber States or the Union. There is a need for a uniform approach
throughout the Union to ensure adequate protection of the environ-
ment and prevent interstate discord. Conversely, allowing all deci-
sions to be made at the national level would allow Member States
to control environmental policy impacting local environmental
quality.87 The principle of subsidiarity has served to mediate these
competing concepts of federalism and proximity.
The concept of subsidiarity requires that "regulatory decisions be
taken at the lowest effective level."88 Subsidiarity prevents the Un-
ion from encroaching on the prerogatives of the Member States to
regulate local affairs. The principle was expressed in the Treaty on
the European Union89 as a part of Article 3b which states in rele-
vant part:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and in-so-far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
85. Id.
86. von Moltke, supra note 74, at 275.
87. Bermann, supra note 53, at 339. In his article, Taking Subsidiarity Seri-
ously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, Professor
Bermann presents six fundamental reasons why there is a preference for gover-
nance at the most local level. These are: self-determination and accountability,
political liberty, flexibility, preservation of identities, diversity, and respect for
internal divisions of component states.
88. Fischer, supra note 50, at 425. Fischer also compares the concept of
subsidiarity as a limitation on Community powers with the "necessary and prop-
er" clause of the United States Constitution as a limitation on the legislative
powers of the United States government. Id. at 437.
89. Treaty of Rome, supra note 43.
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can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed
action, be better achieved by the Community. 9"
Even before its recognition in the Treaty on the European Union,
the principle of subsidiarity was evident in the environmental provi-
sions of the Single European Act.9 Article 130r(4)92 authorizes
the Community to take action relating to the environment as long
as the expressed objectives could be achieved better at the Commu-
nity level than at the level of the individual Member States.93
Guidelines adopted by the European Council to determine wheth-
er the regulations adopted by the Member States have proven inef-
fective and whether action at the Community level is warranted,94
make clear that the environment is perceived as a Union-wide issue.
In general, the individual Member States cannot effectively address
the transboundary aspects of environmental policy and the risks of
trade restrictions and market distortions are elevated.9"
Subsidiarity is also achieved by the use of directives at the Com-
munity level for the purposes of harmonizing national laws and en-
90. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/01 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992), as discussed in Lenaerts, supra note 67, at
848. The provision is interpreted to require the need for Community action to be
assessed "only if" and that the extent of the action be determined "in so far as."
Id. at 875.
91. Single European Act ("SEA"), O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R.
741.
92. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.1 (Cmd. 5179-II)("E.C. Treaty"), as
amended by Single European Act, supra note 91.
93. Id.
94. The Guidelines adopted by the European Council at its Edinburgh Meet-
ing, December 11, 1992, are as follows:
1. the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be
satisfactorily regulated by action by Member States; and/or
2. actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would
conflict with the requirements of the Treaty or would otherwise significantly
damage Member States' interests; and/or
3. the Council must be satisfied that action at Community level would
produce clear benefits by reason of its scale or effects compared with actions at
the level of the Member States.
See Lenaerts, supra note 67, at 878, for a discussion of these guidelines and their
applicability to environmental policy at the Community level.
95. See Lenaerts, supra note 67, at 878.
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trusting the execution of Community law to the Member States. A
directive is "binding as to the result to be achieved, upon each
Member State to which it is addressed, but [leaves] to the national
authorities the choice of form and methods."96 This would, for
instance, allow the Union to set a minimum recycling rate for the
Community, but would give the power to interpret the Directive
and implement its provisions to the Member States. This would
provide the flexibility to govern environmental issues to some de-
gree at the local level.97
In its Report to the European Council, "the Commission made it
clear that it will not allow the application of the subsidiarity prin-
ciple to lower or compromise the high level of existing Community
environmental standards."98 Hence, Article 130t allows Member
States to adopt more stringent environmental measures so long as
they are not used to create a barrier protecting domestic trade from
competition." Article 130t states in relevant part that "protective
measures adopted in common ... shall not prevent any Member
State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective
measures."'" However, the Article cautions that "such measures
must be compatible with this Treaty . . . ."'0' This provision
thereby preempts a Member State's power to adopt an environmen-
tal measure that results in market distortion.
2. The Proportionality Doctrine
The doctrine of proportionality serves to limit the means avail-
able to the Community to act.1 12 The E.C. Treaty states that "any
action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty. 1 °3 The 1992 European
Council, in its Edinburgh Conclusions, clarified the doctrine's ap-
plication to policy-making." 4 According to the Council's guide-
96. Lenaerts, supra note 67, at 853 (quoting E.C. Treaty, supra note 92).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 888.
99. Id. at 862-63.
100. Id. at 862 (quoting E.C. Treaty, supra note 92, at art. 130t).
101. Id.
102. Bermann, supra note 53, at 369.
103. Id. at 346 n.41 (quoting E.C. Treaty, supra note 92, art. 3b).
104. The guidelines from the Edinburgh Conclusions state as follows:
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lines, financial or administrative burdens in legislation should be
minimized and "should be proportionate to the objective to be achieved."'
Proportionality may be described as a principle of judicial re-
ii) Any burdens, whether financial or administrative, falling
upon the Community, national governments, local authorities, eco-
nomic operators and citizens, should be minimised and should be
porportionate [sic] to the objective to be
achieved.
iii) Community measures should leave as much scope for na-
tional decision as possible, consistent with securing the aim of the
measure and observing the requirements of the Treaty. While respect-
ing Community law, care should be taken to respect well established
national arrangements and the organisation and working of Member
States' legal systems. Where appropriate and subject to the need for
proper enforcement, Community measures should provide Member
States with alternative ways to achieve the objectives of the measures.
iv) Where it is necessary to set standards at Community level,
consideration should be given to setting minimum standards, with
freedom for Member States to set higher national standards ... where
this would not conflict with the objectives of the proposed measure or
with the Treaty.
v) The form of action should be as simple as possible, consis-
tent with satisfactory achievement of the objective of the measure and
the need for effective enforcement. The Community should legislate
only to the extent necessary. Other things being equal, directives
should be preferred to regulations and framework directives to de-
tailed measures. Non-binding measures such as recommendations
should be preferred where appropriate. Consideration should also be
given where appropriate to the use of voluntary codes of conduct.
vi) Where appropriate under the Treaty, and provided this is
sufficient to achieve its objectives, preference in choosing the type of
Community action should be given to encouraging cooperation be-
tween Member States, coordinating national action or to complement-
ing, supplementing or supporting such action.
vii) Where difficulties are localized and only certain Member
States are affected, any necessary Community action should not be ex-
tended to other Member States unless this is necessary to achieve an
objective of the Treaty.
25 E.C. Bull., no. 12, at 14-16, 94 (1992). See also Bermann, supra note 53, at
387 n.234 (quoting European Council in Edinburgh, Conclusions of the
Presidence, December 12-13, 1992).
105. Lenaerts, supra note 67, at 884 (quoting 25 E.C. Bull., no. 12, at 15, 4
(1992)).
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view." Every Community action must satisfy three criteria to
avoid violating the proportionality principle. 7 First, the rationali-
ty criterion requires that the measure be reasonably, and presumably
legitimately, related to the objective the action is intended to serve.
Second, the utility component dictates that the costs of the action
"must not manifestly outweigh its benefits."'0 8 Finally, the chosen
action must be the least burdensome of the available alterna-
tives. 9
In the field of environmental policy, the doctrine of proportion-
ality demands that Community actions should leave "as much scope
for national decisions as possible.""' Again, a directive is the fa-
vored form of legislation as a proportional instrument. Directives
allow the Member States to chose the form or method of imple-
menting legislation which provides minimum standards and permits
national standards to exceed Community-wide standards."'
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The establishment of a separate and distinct environmental
policy in the Union allows the selection of harmonization candi-
dates based upon environmental priorities rather than on the extent
to which variations in national laws operate as a trade barrier.
A. Environmental Action Programs
The European Union uses two measures to address environmental
issues: environmental action programs and legislation. Action pro-
grams are strategic environmental frameworks used to set broad
environmental policy."2 The programs, developed by the Com-
mission and approved by the Council, are considered general state-
ments of intent as there is no formal commitment to take actions on
106. Bermann, supra note 53, at 387.
107. id. at 386.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Lenaerts, supra note 67, at 884 (quoting 25 E.C. Bull.).
111. Id. at 853-54.
112. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1 (Graham
Bennett, ed., 1991).
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the proposals included in the programs." 3 Currently, the European
Union is working under its fifth action program."4
The earliest action programs focused on broad principles, while
later programs became increasingly substantive."5 The 1973 envi-
ronmental action program represented the first specific political
commitment to tackle an expansive range of environmental prob-
lems at the supranational level, yet lacked concrete control mea-
sures.
116
The 1977 action program designated pollutants as candidates for
air quality standards." 7 The third program, in 1982, recognized
the problems of acid rain and other trans-boundary pollutants." 8
The objective of the action program, covering the years 1987 to
1992, was to set and implement Community standards for emissions
reductions to combat acid deposition and slow forest die-back."9
The current action program, adopted in 1992 and entitled "To-
wards Sustainability: A European Community Programme of Policy
and Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Devel-
opment," addresses the period between 1993 and 2000 and calls for
greater cooperation between consumers, industry, and govern-
ment. The major objectives of the program are: sustainable de-
velopment, integration of environmental policy into all E.C. legisla-
tion, and shared responsibility.' 2' This action program explicitly
recognizes the principle of subsidiarity.
Community-wide legislation is adopted to meet the goals of the
113. Id.
114. See 5th Action Programme Passes Test by Council of Ministers, EUROPE-
AN INTELLIGENCE, Jan. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, EURINT
File.
115. Am POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note
112, at 1.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1-2.
120. 5th Action Programme Passes Test by Council of Ministers, supra note
114, at 1.
121. For a discussion of the current action program, see 5th Action Programme
Passes Test by Council of Ministers, EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE, supra note 114;
Main Lines of Community Action for the First Half of 1993, EUROPE ENERGY,
Jan. 22, 1993.
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programs. Since the first action program, over 200 environmental
measures have been adopted.'22 Legislation is often in the form of
non-binding recommendations and resolutions, decisions binding
upon the addressee, and regulations that are directly binding on all
Member States. 23 Directives which must be implemented by the
laws or regulations of the States, have been the main tool of Com-
munity environmental policy for the last twenty years.
124
B. European Union Air Quality Directives
The European Community first began to regulate air quality at
the federal level in 1970."' Its earliest directives established
emissions limits for motor vehicles and set fuel standards for sulfur
and lead content. 26 These limits were intended to eliminate the
trade barriers resulting from differing national standards.'27 It was
not until 1980 that the E.C. introduced the first Community-wide
ambient air quality standards for sulphur dioxide and suspended
particulates (dust). 128 This act fulfilled the E.C.'s obligation as a
signatory of the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution.'29 Some Member Countries objected
to the Community-wide air quality standards. The German govern-
122. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note
112, at 1.
123. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT LEGISLATION, supra note 39, at
xiv.
124. Id. at xiii-xiv.
125. von Moltke, supra note 74, at 98-99. For further discussion of the Europe-
an Union directives regarding air quality and emissions standards, see STANLEY
P. JOHNSON & GUY CORCELLE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 109-157 (Graham & Trotman 1989).
126. Am POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note
112, at 3.
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id. at 2.
129. Armin Rosencranz, The ECE Convention of 1979 on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution, 75 A.J.I.L. 975-77 (1981). The Geneva Convention
is an environmental agreement signed by, inter alia, the U.S. and Canada and
designed to reduce air pollution. The Convention requires that the contracting
parties develop policies and strategies to reduce air pollution, particularly sulphur
emissions. It also contains provisions regarding monitoring, information ex-
change, consultations, and research. Id.
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ment complained that it would be unable to meet the E.C. standards
in many industrialized regions of the country without implementing
costly pollution control measures. 3 ' Germany's position changed
within a few years, however, after studies appeared documenting
extensive forest damage from air pollution throughout Germany,
Switzerland, and Austria."' In response, the German government
adopted national emissions standards even more stringent than the
E.C. Air Quality Directive required.'
Germany's pollution emissions limits have been described as
"draconian."' 33 They require all existing fossil fuel fired power
plants to retro-fit state of the art sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide
emissions control equipment. The German government even at-
tempted to persuade the E.C. to impose its domestic emissions
standards Community-wide, in recognition of the fact that
Germany's forests were being affected by pollution emissions from
other E.C. Member States. This effort, however, was only partially
successful. The E.C. issued a directive adopting the German emis-
sions standards for new plants, but Member States were given
broad discretion to determine how much to reduce their emissions
from 1980 levels.134
While the E.C. has declined to adopt Germany's stringent emis-
sions standards wholesale, the lower Community-wide standards
have still resulted in reduced emissions levels in a majority of
Member States.'35 In 1986, the Commission of the European
130. JOHNSON & CORCELLE, supra note 125, at 110. Early German and United
Kingdom opposition rendered effective control of power plant emissions impossi-
ble, and all countries sought to hinder the rigorous control of automobile emis-
sions, von Moltke, supra note 74, at 98.
131. JOHNSON & CORCELLE, supra note 125, at 110.
132. von Moltke, supra note 74, at 98.
133. JOHNSON & CORCELLE, supra note 125, at 110.
134. von Moltke, supra note 74, at 99. Having encouraged tighter standards,
however, Germany has arguably not even fully complied with the lower standards
imposed by the European Union. An ordinance implementing three European
Community air quality directives regarding standards for sulfur dioxide, suspend-
ed particles, nitrogen dioxide and lead was approved in February of 1993 after
Germany was found to be in violation of two directives in 1991 and forced to
strengthen its air quality regulations. Cabinet Approves Ordinance to Implement
Three EC Directives on Air Quality Limits, Mar. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS,
ENVIRN Library, BNAIED File.
135. JOHNSON & CORCELLE, supra note 125, at 110. "Even if most Community
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Communities reported steadily declining levels of air pollution
throughout the region.131 More recently, the Economic Commis-
sion for Europe reported that all but the most economically- disad-
vantaged countries in the E.C. had experienced substantial reduc-
tions in annual sulfur emissions. 137 The figures from that report
are shown in Table 3.138 Germany's 1988 sulfur emissions de-
clined to less than 50 percent of its 1980 emissions level even
though the E.C. adopted less stringent standards. In fact, the emis-
sions data show reduced SO2 emissions in almost all Member Coun-
tries.
Table 3
European Emissions of Sulphur Dioxide
SO2 (1000 ton/yr)
1980 1985 1988
Austria 195 95 61
Belgium 414 226 207
Denmark 224 170 121
Finland 292 191 151
France 1670 738 607
Germany (FRG) 1600 1200 620
Greece 200 250 -
Ireland 110 69 74
Italy 1900 1252 1205
Luxembourg 12 8 -
Netherlands 248 137 139
Portugal 133 99 102
Spain 1625 1095 -
Sweden 256 142 107
United 2447 1859 1907
measures do not go as far as the German Government might have wished, they
do nevertheless have a much wider field of application [which] increas[es] the
effectiveness of the fight against atmospheric pollution, which by its very nature
recognizes no borders." Id.
136. THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 131-
177 (Commission of the European Communities 1986). Although the Commission
attributes much of the decline to economic slowdown, the report recognizes the
contribution of European Community directives in the improvement. Id.
137. U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, THE ENVIRONMENT IN Eu-
ROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, Annotated Statistics 1992, at 65-69, U.N. Sales No.
92-II-E-14 (1992).
138. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, THE ENVIRONMENT IN EUROPE
AND NORTH AMERICA, ANNOTATED STATISTICS 1992, at 67 tbl. 1-2.1.3, U.N.
Sales No. 92-II-E.14 (1992).
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Similarly, there has been a reduction in carbon and lead emis-
sions and total suspended particles in the Member States. Although
the data is not complete, the Economic Commission tables repro-
duced in Table 4, show a general trend toward decreasing emis-
sions.'39
Table 4
European Emissions of
Carbon Dioxide, Lead and Total and Total Suspended Particles
C02 (1000 tons) LEAD (1000 tons) TSP (1000 tons)
1980 1985 1988 1980 1985 1988 1980 1985 1988
Austria - 56300 56500 0.966 0.293 0.258 75 55 39
Belgium - - - - - - - - -
Denmark 63000 62300 57900 - -
Finland 54300 48600 52000 0.45 97
France 449800 303900 279200 - 427 324 284
Germany (F.R.G.) 780000 720000 710000 4.4 3.1 690 580 530
Greece - - - - - - - -
Ireland 0.9 0.4 94 117 -
Italy - - 386 390 452
Luxembourg - - -
Netherlands 150000 149000 148000 1.3 1.4 0.45 146 99 93
Portugal - - 37800 - - - 119 93 -
Spain - - - 1521 1583
Sweden 81000 67000 63000 170 -
United Kingdom 602900 567400 584800 7.5 6.5 3.1 572 555 533
As with the case of federal pollution control in the United
States,"' the European Union's experience with the regulation of
air pollution suggests that the federalization of pollution control can
have a pronounced positive impact on region-wide or continent-
wide environmental quality, despite its limiting effect on the ability
of Member States to further improve their own environmental qual-
ity by adopting more stringent standards. As the study of packaging
waste regulation shows, when Member States are free to adopt
more stringent standards, they tend to improve their own environ-
mental quality at the expense of other Member or non-member
States. 14
139. Id. at 69-70 tbls. 1-2.1.5 & 1-2.1.6.
140. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 164-236 and accompanying text.
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IV. A CASE STUDY: PACKAGING WASTE REGULATION IN THE
E.U.
The first packaging waste legislation was passed by the German
government in 1991.42 France followed with a similar law in
1993."4 The Dutch government also addressed the issue of pack-
aging waste in 1991, but in the form of voluntary agreements with
industry rather than legislation.'" The European Commission first
proposed a harmonizing directive on packaging and packaging
waste in 1992, but the legislation was not enacted until the end of
1994. Between the Directive's proposal and passage, the Member
States contested the recovery and recycling target rates and the
allowance of incineration.'45 This Part details the legislation that
was originally adopted in Germany, France, and The Netherlands. It
also describes the Directive that was recently passed in the Europe-
an Union, and the impact the legislation is likely to have on the
regional environment.
A. The German Packaging Ordinance
Germany, with a population of 81 million, is Europe's largest
waste producer and trash exporter.'" To deal with the increasing-
ly difficult problem of waste disposal, Germany developed a regula-
tory scheme based on the concept of Kreislaufwirtschaft, or a
closed circulatory economy where all products are reused.'47
The movement toward a closed circle economy began in 1991
with the passage of the German Ordinance on the Avoidance of
Packaging Waste.'" The Verpackungsverordnung, or Tdpfer Law
as it is often called in reference to former German Environmental
142. THE PACKAGING ORDINANCE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, § 1(1)
Bundesministerium fur Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, June 23,
1993 (F.R.G.).
143. See infra notes 237-49 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 252-285 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
146. Ferdinand Protzman, Germany's Push to Expand the Scope of
Recycling, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1993, at 8.
147. Ariane Genillard, Business and the Environment: Too Much of a Good
Thing, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), June 23, 1993, at 18.
148. Id.
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Minister Klaus T6pfer, went into effect on June 12, 1991." The
objective of the Ordinance was to reduce packaging to the extent
possible and reuse or recycle packaging that could not be eliminat-
ed. 5' The law was ground-breaking environmental legislation,
widely regarded as establishing the world's strictest recycling re-
quirements.
The Ordinance establishes the amount of waste that must be
recycled by setting both collection targets and sorting targets for
products placed on the German market, with the sorting target
expressed as a percentage of the material collected. 5' Recycling
quotas are set based on the type of material and, with a short
phase-in period, the quotas must reach their targets by 1995. Effec-
tive July 1, 1995, the minimum collection rates are 80% for all
materials, and sorting targets range from 80% of plastics, paper,
and cardboard to 90% of glass, tin plate, and aluminum packag-
ing.'52 Under the current Ordinance, incineration for energy recov-
ery is not permitted, so that all material collected and sorted must
be recycled.'53 The quotas are staggering for some materials; for
example, prior to the law's adoption, only 4% of plastics were
recycled. 5 4
1. Packaging Waste Take-back Requirements
The Topfer Law imposes a "take back" requirement on industry
to encourage the re-use or recycling of packaging materials. The
Ordinance has two underlying premises: first, packaging materials
should not become waste; and second, those who sell packaged
149. Verpackungsverordnung ("Verpack VO") [Ordinance on the Avoidance of
Packaging Waste], June 12, 1991 (promulgated pursuant to Abfallgesetz [Waste
Avoidance and Waste Management Act] 1986 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1.] 1 1410)
[hereinafter Ordinance].
150. THE PACKAGING ORDINANCE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note
142, at § 1(1).
151. Ordinance, supra note 149, at Annex to Art. 6, 3, § 2, Quantitative
Requirements for Collecting Systems, and § 3 Quantitative Requirements to be
Met by Sorting Facilities.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. E. Gifford Stack, Green Dot Not for U.S.: Germany's Packaging Law
Doesn't Make Sense Here, BEVERAGE INDUSTRY, Sept. 1993, at 50.
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products should be responsible for disposing of the packaging mate-
rial in an environmentally conscientious manner.'55
The take back requirement applies to both consumer packaging
and commercial transport, display, and sales packaging regardless
of the material.'56 Transport and display packaging must be taken
back and recycled or reused by each link in the distribution
chain.5 7 Sorting and recycling targets are not prescribed for trans-
port and "secondary" packaging. 5 Recycling for these materials
is only required where "technically possible and economically justi-
fiable."'59 If the packaging is not recycled or reused, the manufac-
turer or distributor must pay for the material's disposal through
private means. The public waste management system presently does
not accept packaging waste. 6'
Sales packaging, regardless of the brand or place of purchase,
must be taken back without charge from the end-user by all pack-
aging related businesses in or near their stores.' 6' An exemption
to the law, however, allows manufacturers to relieve themselves of
the duty to take back packaging waste from the final consumer by
participating in a government approved waste management sys-
tem. 62 The system that resulted from this exemption remains a
155. Pan Demetrakakes, European Packaging Laws: A Pandora's Box; Laws
are Complex and Compliance is Costly, PACKAGING, Feb. 1993, at 51.
156. THE PACKAGING ORDINANCE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note
142, at § 2, 8.
157. Turner T. Smith & Lucas S. Bergkamp, Packaging Waste Developments
in Germany and the Netherlands (BNA) Oct. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Envirn Library, BNAIED File.
158. THE PACKAGING ORDINANCE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note
142, at § 2, 7.
159. Id. "For transport and secondary packaging collection, sorting and reuse
quota are not prescribed... ; the packaging has to be recycled whenever this is
technically possible and economically justifiable and where a market for the
substances thus recovered already exists or can at least be buil[t] up." Id.
160. Id. "What is not allowed in any case, however, is disposal via the general,
publicly financed waste disposal system, so that the manufacturer or distributor
has indeed to pay for the actual disposal costs in all cases where reuse/recycling
is not possible or is not justifiable from an economic point of view." Id.
161. Smith & Bergkamp, supra note 157.
162. Id. at § 2, 10. "Pursuant to Art. 6 para. 3 of the Ordinance the obliga-
tion to accept the return of the packaging does not apply to manufacturers and
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model for other European Union countries.
163
2. The Duales System Deutschland
To meet the consumer packaging take-back requirement, a con-
sortium for waste collection, the Duales System Deutschland
("DSD"), was created by numerous and diverse business
groups. 164 The DSD is a private organization with over 400 share-
holders that collects and sorts waste from over 96% of German
households.165 The Tiipfer Law imposes few requirements on the
DSD.' 6 It is largely left to private industry and the market to
make the system work. 167 But the stakes are high: if the DSD fails
to meet the recycling quotas imposed by the Tiipfer Law, retailers
are legally bound to take back packaging material directly from
their customers.1
68
Fees charged by the DSD are based on the "polluter pays" princi-
ple, which dictates that whoever uses or manufactures a product
should share the responsibility for the pollution costs associated
with the product. 169 DSD is funded by variable license fees paid
by manufacturers, distributors, or importers based upon the volume
of packaging and, as of October of 1993, a product's packaging
materials. 7 This forces manufacturers to internalize the cost of
the DSD so that product prices paid by the consumer reflect the
distributors who are party to a so-called dual collection system which takes over
the blanket collection of used sales packaging from the final consumer." Id.
163. European Packaging Laws: Take-back Schemes, Product Standards, and
Eco-taxes, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, 158, 192 (Feb. 23, 1994).
164. THE PACKAGING ORDINANCE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note
142, at § 3, 12. The term Duales System Deutschland means "Dual System
Germany."
165. Genillard, supra note 147, at 18.
166. Regulations concerning this system merely contain certain collection and
sorting quotas as well as certain target quotas for the maintenance of the existing
levels achieved in the reuse of drinks packaging. THE PACKAGING ORDINANCE
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 142, at § 3, 112.
167. Smith & Bergkamp, supra note 157.
168. Genillard, supra note 147, at 18.
169. Has Germany Bitten Off More Than it Can Chew?, PACKAGING WEEK,
Apr. 8, 1993, at 22.
170. Id.
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recycling cost of the product packaging. 7' Payment of the fee is
evidenced by a Gruner Punkt, or green dot, on the product which
indicates to consumers that the material will be reused or recy-
cled.' A package bearing a green dot costs consumers on aver-
age an additional two pfennigs (the equivalent of approximately 1.4
cents),' but no longer has to be taken back by the retailer after
use.
174
The DSD does not engage in recycling, but relies on other enti-
ties to recycle the material it collects and sorts. Therefore, the DSD
does not issue a license for any sales package for which a binding
agreement to recycle has not been made.' Since products whose
packaging does not contain DSD's green dot can be returned to the
place of purchase, German retailers are increasingly requiring li-
censed products from their suppliers. 7
6
Critics argue that the DSD duplicates the municipal waste man-
agement system and ignores the existing infrastructure established
by the Topfer Law.177 The DSD consortium is far from akin to a
public waste management system. The use of the public waste
management system for collection of packaging materials is incon-
sistent with the government's aim to force industry to manage its
own packaging waste and eliminates the incentive to reduce excess
packaging. The DSD, however, furthers the government objectives
by making industry and business groups directly responsible for the
law's collection and sorting targets for consumer sales packaging
waste.'78
The DSD has also been accused of "fostering a concentration in
the waste industry" by its use of a network of disposal
171. Stack, supra note 154, at 50.
172. Id.
173. Demetrakakes, supra note 154, at 51. See also Ariane Genillard, Falling
Victim to Its Own Success-Germany's Recycling Scheme is Under Attack From
Both Industry and Environmentalists, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at 16.
174. Demetrakakes, supra note 154, at 51.
175. Smith & Bergkamp, supra note 156.
176. Stack, supra note 153, at 50.
177. Id.
178. Packaging Waste Developments in Germany and The Netherlands, 14 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 19, 522, 524-25 (Sept. 25, 1991).
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contractors. 179 Small recyclers dependent on the DSD to supply
collected waste claimed that the system prevented competition and
was forcing them out of business. Members of the recycling indus-
try associated with the DSD claim that large investments are neces-
sary for recycling under the system.'8 0 Although recycling and
waste disposal companies freely compete for commissions from the
company, the DSD sought to appease independent waste haulers
who attacked the system as anti-competitive by offering a compen-
sation measure.'
In recent years, Germany's Federal Cartel Office has investigated
claims that the private collection system was fostering a monopoly,
and in 1992 ruled against any extension of the DSD's activities to
commercial waste.8 2 Presently, the DSD's responsibility for waste
collection only extends to households, caf6s, bars, and small busi-
nesses."3 Further fueling the controversy, the DSD also found it-
self nearing bankruptcy in 1993. The company did not generate
sufficient funds from its green dot licensing to manage the quantity
of waste it received.'84 One source suggested that some manufac-
turers were reporting the volume of their sales inaccurately and,
thus, making under-payments for the DSD licenses. 5 Although
90% of the primary packaging on German markets carries the green
dot for recycling, it was estimated that only 60% of the companies
paid the DSD licensing fees in 1993.86
Additionally, the system was overburdened by its own success.
The recycling program is voluntary for German consumers. The
public participated enthusiastically and put out three or four times
the amount of packaging materials for pick-up than was anticipat-
179. Genillard, supra note 173, at 16.
180. Id.
181. Jon Reeds, UK: Government Fears Big Recycling "War," REUTER
TEXTLINE SURVEYOR, Mar. 25, 1993.
182. Michael Rose & David Perchard, Business and the Law: When Waste is
not Wanted-Germany's Recycling Legislation, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1994, at 18.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Victor D. Chase, The German Packaging Experience, APPLIANCE MANU-
FACTURER, Apr. 1, 1994, at 12.
186. Germany's Polluter-Pays Concept Viewed As Possible Model For U.S.
Industry, Public, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 50, 2098, 2099 (Apr. 15, 1994).
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ed,'87 40% of which were not even licensed to be collected by the
DSD. '8 Since consumers were not charged for waste pick-up, the
volume of waste overwhelmed the financial capabilities of the
DSD. 8 9
B. Results of the Ordinance in Germany
When the Packaging Ordinance went into effect, the German
recycling industry was not prepared to fulfill the law's require-
ments."l Although some recycling industries, like the glass indus-
try, were well developed before the law's implementation, and were
able to handle the increased demands, the capacity of other less
developed recycling industries have remained below the targets set
by the Ordinance.' German warehouses have been stacked to the
ceiling with sorted packaging being stored for recycling for which
no resale market exists.192 The DSD was concerned about the re-
cycling responsibilities it would be facing, and consequently looked
to industry to invest in recycling facilities. Bette Fishbein provides
a chart comparing recycling quotas with recycling capacity in Ger-
many in her book, GERMANY, GARBAGE AND THE GREEN DOT:
CHALLENGING THE THROWAWAY SOCIETY. 3
Corparisor of Recycling Quotas with Recycling Capacity
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187. Ann Kulik, German Waste Disposal Evolves Under New Laws, WORLD
WASTES, Sept. 1993, at 16.
188. Chase, supra note 185.
189. Rose & Perchard, supra note 182.
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The data from this graph shows the DSD's lack of capacity to
meet the 1995 targets of the Ordinance. However, these figures
were derived from data provided by the DSD and, admittedly,
include contracts for recycling in other countries. Domestic capacity
is undoubtedly smaller; thus, the variance between quota and capac-
ity is substantially higher than the graph indicates. Additionally, the
data regarding the material for recycling merely lists the
Ordinance's quota for recycling, and not the amount of material
collected. Therefore, the actual amount of packaging material col-
lected for recycling is, in reality, up to ten times higher than the
1993 quota. This disparity exists because for some material, such as
plastic, the original quota was only 10% of the material collected.
This leaves mountains of recyclable waste for which no domestic
recycling capacity exists. The lack of technical capacity and the
high costs of landfilling the unrecycled waste has created a tremen-
dous economic incentive to export packaging waste to other E.U.
Member and non-member Countries.
The chemical industry, specifically, has been criticized for de-
faulting on its promise to develop new recycling technologies.'94
But Germany is currently in the midst of an economic recession. If
the chemical companies are already losing money, where will the
money for this type of investment come from?'95
Most companies pass the cost of recycling their product's pack-
aging waste onto the consumer, thereby increasing Germany's al-
ready high product prices and possibly eroding German compet-
itiveness."9 The law has increased Germany's already large bu-
reaucracy. With a six billion dollar price-tag to start, and an esti-
mated annual cost of two and a half billion, 97 the cost may drive
companies with small profit margins out of business.
Regardless of the claimed negative economic impact of the Ordi-
nance, the German government is expanding its waste management
regulation beyond packaging to include recycling products them-
selves.'98 Legislation has been proposed requiring that automo-
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biles and electronic products be recycled at the end of their useful
lives.'"
C. Earopean Impacts of the German Ordinance
The DSD consortium became financially stable in 1994." o
However, the volume of waste that continues to be collected is still
creating problems for Germany and other Member States of the
European Union.2"' German processing capacity proved woefully
inadequate to handle the packaging material landslide that the law
brought about, resulting in large surpluses of recyclable materi-
als. 202
In 1993, Germany had a waste paper surplus estimated at two
million tons203 and collected approximately four times the amount
of plastics that its infrastructure had the capacity to recycle.2 4 In
the same year, Germany collected 400,000 tons of plastics but only
had the capacity to recycle 124,000 tons.20 5 It was estimated that
an additional 152,000 tons of plastic could be recycled in other
countries in Europe20 6 and "as far away as the Far East., 27
These figures make clear that Germany's collected waste substan-
tially exceeds the European recycling capacity, thus defeating the
purpose of the waste collecting and recycling scheme.2 8
The excess secondary raw material from the high recovery quotas
and overzealous collection flooded the recycling market causing re-
cyclable raw material prices to plummet.2° It has become less ex-
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pensive for European recyclers to buy German plastics and waste
paper than to collect it themselves."' Member States have even
alleged that recyclers have been paid to take German packaging
waste.2  This amounted to a government subsidy of plastic waste,
paper, and glass, 2 ' which, in turn, undermined recycling program
development in other Member Nations, and contributed to the clo-
sure of some European recycling plants.2"3 For example, it is less
expensive to import black polythene film used to cover farm silage
from Germany than to collect the material from English farms.
Consequently, the competition from subsidized German paper and
paperboard has forced an estimated ten percent of English paper
mills out of business. 4
The DSD fully utilized the recycling capacity of many European
nations, but the over-collection still left mountains of waste for
which there was simply no market. As a result, excess waste from
the German recycling program found its way into landfills. 215 The
DSD organizers have conceded that some of the collected waste
would simply be thrown away,2 6 but problems have arisen as
waste was discovered in foreign disposal sites. German packaging
materials were reportedly found in France, Eastern Europe, and
Southeast Asia.2 7 For example, in 1992 plastic waste from Ger-
many was found mixed with hospital waste in an illegal dump in
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France.2 1 Plastic waste was also delivered to Slovenia, Romania,
and Hungary, to which Germany also reportedly exported toxic
chemicals and pesticides.1 9 In effect, Germany is merely export-
ing its waste problems.22 ° The Ordinance allows waste to be clas-
sified as raw material and to be exported,221 resulting in "more
outbound shipments of waste from what is already the world's
biggest waste exporter.
222
Several Member States have criticized the exemption in the
Tdpfer Law as the source of the DSD debacle and its effects on the
Common Market. Packaging and waste reduction continues to be a
goal of the European Union, but the German law has destabilized
the recycling market.223 The Union has received complaints from
France, Britain, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Nether-
lands regarding the effects of exported German waste resulting
from the packaging ordinance.2
In August of 1994, the European Commission instituted a legal
action against Germany, charging that the legislation constituted an
unacceptable barrier to trade. 25 The Commission hinted at the Eu-
ropean Union's primary goal of establishing a single internal mar-
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CHEM. Bus. NEWS BASE, Nov. 6, 1992. At least nine trucks were caught in
France illegally transporting syringes, bloodbags, and other hospital waste from
Germany. Bonn Set to Crack Down on Garbage Smuggling, THE REUTER LI-
BRARY REP., Aug. 28, 1992. Greenpeace claims to have found thousands of tons
of waste from the DSD in Indonesia and empty ships returning to Asia are said
to be filled with German waste. Genillard, supra note 147, at 18.
219. Bonn Set to Crack Down on Garbage Smuggling, supra note 218. In the
face of such accusations, DSD called for the investigation of waste disposal con-
tractors and the German Technical Inspection Agency was created to verify sort-
ing and recycling plants. Genillard, supra note 173, at 16.
220. U.K.: Department of the Environment--Tim Yeo to Challenge Germans on
Plastics Recycling Glut, supra note 207.
221. Genillard, supra note 173, at 16.
222. Commission Says No to Action Against German Waste Flows, REUTER
EUR. COMM. REP., June 29, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, REUEC
File.
223. France Threatens Waste Import Ban, FIN. TIMES, June 30, 1993, at P2.
224. EU: Commission Opposes German Packaging Law, REUTER TEXTLINE
CHEM. Bus. NEWS BASE, Aug. 20, 1994.
225. Commission to Take Germany to Court Over Packaging Law, 17 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, 158 (Mar. 1, 1994).
19951
196 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
ket, with other concerns, such as environmental problems, bearing
secondary importance. Under the Treaty of Rome, for instance, in-
fringement proceedings may be brought against a Member State if
the effects of a law, such as the Packaging Ordinance, are found to
be incompatible with the single market objective of the E.U.226
The essential question, thus, is whether forced recycling of this
magnitude actually improves the quality of the environment. Some
recycling can have a negative ecological impact.2 7 For example,
in the recycling of plastics, a great deal of energy is required. Be-
cause so little raw material is ultimately recovered, plastic recycling
may be ecologically and economically less viable than "down-cy-
cling" through incineration.228 It has been suggested that plastic is
only recycled for political reasons. 9
The German law's prohibition of incineration means that pack-
aging material must be recycled regardless of cost. As a result,
collecting packaging materials for recycling where the infrastructure
does not exist creates above-ground landfills.23 Waste collected
for recycling where there is insufficient capacity to recycle it, is
ultimately still waste.
The lack of investment in the recycling industry, however, is
fundamentally solvable if the government and industry worked
together to develop the resources necessary to meet the Ordinance's
requirements. Technology-forcing regulations have proven success-
ful,3 and the Ordinance has already prompted the development
of new recycling technology.232
226. Genillard, supra note 173, at 16.
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Critics have dismissed the concept of a circulatory economy for a
variety of reasons. In addition to criticizing the concept as a "uto-
pian dream," opponents have also attacked the German government
for viewing waste management far too narrowly, for example, by
not allowing incineration to supplement their recycling capabili-
ties.233 The alternative to the take-back scheme or deposit and
return system for packaging materials, "zero packaging," has been
called "naively simplistic." '234 But Germany's bold legislation has
actually reduced the amount of packaging materials going to Ger-
man landfills.
Packaging waste in Germany declined approximately a half-mil-
lion tons to 11.8 million tons in 1993 from the previous year.235
Environmental Minister Klaus T6pfer called this statistic "proof that
the packaging ordinance is reducing waste substantially despite
claims to the [contrary]. 2 36 Although the government estimated
that one million fewer tons of packaging waste have ended up in
German landfills since the law was passed in 1991, one must won-
der how much of that packaging found its way into disposal sites in
other countries.
D. Packaging Regulations in Other E.U. Member Countries
1. The French Packaging Decree
France was the second European country to pass legislation regu-
lating packaging waste. 23 The Decree Regarding Waste Resulting
From The Abandonment Of Packaging became effective January 1,
1993.238 It applies to packaging materials used on consumer goods
note 79, at 20. Recycled plastic granules are also being tested for use in lieu of
oil in the iron-ore oxidation process in steelmaking by several German compa-
nies. Environment Ministry, Paper Producers Reach an Accord on Voluntary
Recycling Scheme, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21, 856 (Oct. 19, 1994).
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law, 75-633 on the elimination of waste [hereinafter Decree]. See Demetrakakes,
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and merchandising and material designed for shipping or displaying
a product. Under the Decree, packaging manufacturers and import-
ers must recover waste from products placed on the French market.
Thus, the French system is based on the principal of producer re-
sponsibility similar to the German law." 9 The goal of the Decree
is to recover 60% of the glass packaging and 50% of the steel,
aluminum, paper, and plastic materials by 1997. By 2002, the goal
is to recover 75% of all recyclable packaging materials.2 ' The
phrase "waste recovery" is used rather than "recycling" because the
Decree allows incineration with energy recuperation to constitute
waste recovery.
Unlike the German system which does not allow incineration,
French companies are able to determine the waste most suitable for
recycling on both an economic and an ecological basis and inciner-
ate the non-recycled waste."' This system minimizes the German
imbalance between material collected and recycling capacity.242
The obligations imposed by the Decree may be met by a com-
pany recovering its own waste through a deposit and return system
or through organizing collection and disposal of waste at a govern-
ment approved site or participating in a waste management system
certified by the French government.243 As in the German system,
the government certified organization would be responsible for
recovering packaging waste.2" Under the French system, howev-
er, local governments are responsible for collecting and sorting the
waste.245 The organization is then responsible for reimbursing the
supra note 155.
239. Creation of Recovery Organization Announced by French Plastic Manu-
facturer, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, 208 (Mar. 26, 1993).
240. Decree, supra note 238.
241. Valorplast, a recovery organization for the plastics manufacturing industry,
focuses recycling efforts on plastics of sufficient weight made of homogeneous
materials to make recycling economically and ecologically efficient. The waste
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243. France-Environmental Packaging Regs, Market Reports, 1994 NAT'L
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local communities for sorting the waste.2" This system eliminates
the charge of service repetition aimed at the DSD for duplicating
the municipal waste collection system.
Eco-Emballage is the private organization set up by numerous
French businesses to meet the requirements of the Packaging
Decree.247 The organization is modeled after Germany's Duales
System Deutschland and is responsible for recovering waste that is
collected and sorted by local officials.2 Eco-Emballage also fi-
nances recycling research programs and local waste recovery opera-
tions.
Eco-Emballage users must pay an initial membership fee of
50,000 franc (approximately $8,600) and a fee of one gentime
(about two cents) per package.249 This per-package fee is expected
to increase to three Ventimes in the near future. The fee allows
members to use the Green Dot logo on their packaging. In 1992,
Eco-Emballage and the Duales System Deutschland agreed to use
the Green Dot as a common logo for identifying recoverable mate-
rial.
2. The Dutch Packaging Covenant
The Dutch government's approach to packaging waste differs
from the German and French approach in one respect. Instead of
enacting legislation, the government sought to make voluntary
covenants with industry to recover and recycle packaging waste.
Packaging waste comprises twenty percent of the weight and up to
fifty percent of the volume of Dutch municipal waste.25 To re-
duce the amount of waste, the Dutch government seeks first and
foremost to reduce the amount of material used in packaging which
ultimately becomes packaging waste. The government has negotiat-
246. Id.
247. Eco-Emballage was the first company to receive certification for the col-
lection of consumer packaging materials. By the end of 1993, three more firms
had received certification: Adelphe for glass, Valorplast for plastics, and
Cyclamed for pharmaceutical packaging materials. Id.
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tion, Recycling, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, 277, 277 (May 22, 1991).
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ed agreements with different sectors of the packaging industry to
motivate the parties to reduce waste."
On June 6, 1991, the Covenant was signed by Hans Alders, the
former Dutch Minister of the Environment, and Rudi Mulder, the
director of the Stichting Verpakking en Milieu, the Dutch Founda-
tion for Packaging and the Environment. It aimed to reduce the use
of packaging materials through required recycling by the year
2000."S The goals of the agreement are to develop new concepts
in product packaging and new material technology, and to avoid
excess packaging. 3
Voluntary agreements with industry on environmental issues have
been used for years by the Dutch government as a form of regula-
tion. 54 These agreements or covenants serve to supplement poli-
cy; they are not considered a substitute for regulation."
Covenants with industry aimed at implementing governmental
policy prepared at the national level are often referred to as general
legislative covenants. 56 These covenants are used in four situa-
tions: (1) when policy objectives cannot be quickly or easily
achieved through regulation; (2) when progress toward achieving a
law's objectives can be made through voluntary action before the
law's adoption; (3) to impose a regulation's requirements on an
industry before it is actually enacted; and (4) to supplement or
251. Dutch Environment Minister Disappointed at Parliament's Packaging
Directive Targets, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, 417, 418 (May 18, 1994).
252. Dutch Packagers Expect Much Progress in 1990s Toward Reducing Pack-
aging Waste, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 13, 372, 372 (July 3, 1991). The
Foundation for Packaging and the Environment represents a substantial part of
Dutch Industries. European Packaging Laws: Take-back Schemes, Product Stan-
dards, and Eco-taxes, supra note 163, at 194.
253. The Packaging Covenant ["Covenant"], The Hague, § 2.2, Quantitative
Prevention, art. 5 (June 6, 1991)(on file with the Fordham Environmental Law
Journal).
254. Some Early Progress Seen Under Covenant on Packaging Waste, Dutch
Commission Says, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21, 772 (Oct. 20, 1993).
255. Lucas Bergkamp, Dutch Environmental Law: An Overview of Recent
Trends, 16 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, 144 (Feb. 24, 1993).
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are called specific "compliance" covenants regulating facilities or certain practic-
es. Id.
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strengthen existing regulation.257
Recently, however, the enforceability of such agreements has
been questioned. Although the Covenant "is a contract which has
the force of a civil law agreement," 8 it is only binding on those
parties that have signed the agreement personally or through an
authorized agent. 9 Also, only those provisions of the Covenant
that are sufficiently concrete and clearly identify the company as
the obligor are likely to be enforceable.2" Therefore, there is
some question as to which provisions can actually be enforced.
When a company becomes a party to a covenant, it is obligated
to contribute toward achieving its goals.26' The government also
has obligations under the Packaging Covenant.262 The Minister of
the Environment must establish sufficient incineration facilities and
landfill alternatives as well as provide a selective collection frame-
work to allow participating companies to meet the established
goals.263
The Dutch Packaging Covenant imposes a "standstill" obligation,
requiring that the total volume of new packaging put into the mar-
ket stream not increase. The agreement aims to reduce the volume
of packaging material by the year 2000 to ten percent below the
1986 level."6 The Covenant also requires that ninety percent of
non-reusable packaging materials must be taken back if selectively
collected, and sixty percent of taken back material must be recy-
257. Id.
258. Doubts Expressed About Legality of Voluntary Pacts on Environment, 14
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 25, 681 (Dec. 18, 1991).
259. Smith & Bergkamp, supra note 157, at 527.
260. Id. at 526. The so-called "declarations of intent" provide examples of
unenforceable provisions of the Packaging Covenant. Some are vague as they do
not identify the obligor and are often not intended to be enforceable obligations.
Id. at 527.
261. Id. at 526.
262. Id. at 528-29.
263. Id. at 529.
264. Covenant, supra note 253, at § 2.2, art. 4. "Packaging" is defined as "the
end product of the packaging industry destined for the packaging of products or
goods." Id. § 1, art. I. Under this definition, the 1986 volume of packaging put
into circulation was two million tons. European Packaging Laws: Take-back
Schemes, Product Standards, and Eco-taxes, supra note 163.
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cled.265 Although the Dutch Packaging Covenant allows incinera-
tion for energy recovery, the agreement limits the amount that may
be incinerated to forty percent, and landfilling is prohibited.26
Intermediate targets have also been set. Parties to the agreement
are committed to holding the 1994 volume of packaging produced
to the 1991 level.267 By 1997, the packaging industry is required
to reduce its production volume to ten percent below the 1991 lev-
el.268 In addition, the agreement requires manufacturers to reduce
the quantity of material used in packaging and limit the use of
materials that cannot be reused or are difficult to recycle.269 It al-
so mandates product re-use and material recycling, and lists some
specific measures to be taken.270 For example, lead tops are no
longer to be used on bottles, and inks containing heavy metals are
to be replaced with less environmentally harmful substances.2 '
The Covenant has provisions for evaluating the agreement regu-
larly between its 1991 implementation and its target achievement
date in the year 2000.272 A commission was created to review the
agreement's implementation and compliance. 273 The commission
has five members, two appointed by the Environment Ministry, two
appointed by the Foundation for Packaging and the Environment,
and one independent chairperson.274 The Commission prepares an-
nual reports on the progress made in achieving the Covenant's
goals.275 It evaluated the agreement in 1994, and will do so again
in 1997.276
265. Covenant, supra note 253, at § 2.5, Art. 10(4) & (5).
266. Smith & Bergkamp, supra note 157, at 10.
267. Some Early Progress Seen Under Covenant on Packaging Waste, Dutch
Commission Says, supra note 254.
268. Covenant, supra note 253, at § 2.2, Art. 4(4).
269. Id. at § 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.
270. Id. at §§ 2.3-2.5.
271. Id. at § 2.3 Art. 7(1).
272. Smith & Bergkamp, supra note 157, at 526.
273. Id.
274. Environment Ministers Sets [sic] Up Commission to Coordinate New
Packaging Waste Effort, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22, 605 (Nov. 6, 1991).
275. Id.
276. Dutch Packagers Expect Much Progress in 1990's Toward Reducing
Packaging Waste, supra note 252. In its second annual report, the Commission
recommended that advisory agencies and other groups that are not parties to the
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The Commission also reviews implementation plans submitted by
the Foundation for Packaging and the Environment.277 Each sector
of the packaging industry is required to prepare an annual imple-
mentation plan,278 based on plans submitted by the businesses par-
ty to the agreement.279 The Commission is required to examine
the implementation plans to "ensure they meet the goals of the
Packaging Covenant.,
28
In its earliest reports, the Commission found that companies were
"taking steps to meet the requirements of [the] Packaging Cove-
nant," but most actions have been "directed at the quantity of pack-
aging waste, rather than its quality. 28 ' Favorable marks were also
given to industry's efforts to increase re-useable packaging, and to
the growing number of companies party to the agreement.2
Compliance with packaging-use obligations is monitored both on
the input side and on the output side.283 On the input side, the
amount of packaging added to products is monitored.8 On the
output side, the volume of packaging found in the waste stream is
watched.285 The remedies for breach of these obligations are nor-
mal contractual remedies, such as damages and injunctive re-
lief. 86
The larger problem with the Dutch Packaging Covenant is not
that the parties to the Covenant are breaching their obligations, but
Covenant like environmental groups be involved in the negotiation of Covenants.
Policy of Negotiating Environmental Pacts with Industry to Continue, Govern-
ment Says, 17 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, 274 (Mar. 23, 1994).
277. See Smith & Bergkamp, supra note 157, at 526.
278. Dutch Packagers Expect Much Progress in 1990's Toward Reducing
Packaging Waste, supra note 252.
279. Environment Ministers Sets [sic] Up Commission to Coordinate New
Packaging Waste Effort, supra note 274.
280. Id.
281. Some Early Progress Seen Under Covenant on Packaging Waste, Dutch-
Commission Says, supra note 254.
282. Bergkamp & Martiri, supra note 209, at 194.
283. Some Early Progress Seen Under Covenant on Packaging Waste, Dutch
Commission Says, supra note 254.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Any dispute arising from the covenant is subject to arbitration by the
agreement's terms. See Smith & Bergkamp, supra note 157.
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that some companies are not joining. Those "free-rider" companies
have not joined the "Foundation for Packaging and the Environ-
ment" and have not signed the agreement individually. They benefit
from the avoided or delayed legislation due to the Covenants, while
they are not obligated to reduce packaging waste.287
Free-riding companies account for approximately ten percent of
the volume of packaging on the Dutch market. 8 Although these
companies are not obliged to take back packaging waste, distribu-
tors and retailers that are party to the agreement have an incentive
to refuse to distribute and sell products of manufacturers that are
not bound by the Packaging Covenant. 89 Ultimately, legislation,
such as the Packaging Covenant, must be enacted to fulfill The
Netherlands' obligation to comply with the European Directive, in
order to eliminate the problem of free-ridership.
E. European Union Directive
The E.U. Directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste was final-
ly adopted by a qualified majority of the European Council on
December 14, 1994.90 It was published in the Official Journal on
December 31, 1994. The Directive, which was originally proposed
by the European Commission on July 15, 1992, has been described
in the media "as the most heavily-lobbied dossier in the history of
the European institutions." '' In the debate before the Directive's
passage, Germany and Denmark argued for high recovery and recy-
cling targets and voted against the Directive, along with The Neth-
erlands, due to these limited targets. 92 Other countries, including
287. Bergkamp, supra note 255, at 148.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. Council Directive 94/62, supra note 1.
291. Environment: Packaging Waste Directive Finally Adopted, EUR. ENERGY,
No. 437, Dec 23, 1994. Also, an article in the FINANCIAL TIMES quotes Peter
Davis, chief executive of the UK's Industry Council for Packaging and the Envi-
ronment as calling the Directive, "one of the most hotly lobbied pieces of Euro-
pean legislation devised." Haig Simonian, Business and the Environment: Pack-
aging Issue Tied in Knots-An EU Directive is Proving Divisive, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
11, 1995, at 18.
292. Simonian, supra note 291.
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the United Kingdom, sought lower target rates.293
The passage of the Directive marks the first time that the Par-
liament and Council co-decision process was successfully used on
an environmental issue. A Common Position on Packaging and
Packaging Waste was formally adopted by the Council on March 4,
1994.294 The European Parliament had its second reading on May
5, 1994, and on May 25, the Commission incorporated the amend-
ments proposed by the Parliament. 295 Germany, Denmark, and
The Netherlands opposed the leniency of the Directive throughout
the debate. 96 By joining the dissenters on June 9, 1994, Belgium
blocked the adoption of the Directive by a qualified majority. How-
ever, an agreement was reached by the Conciliation Committee on
November 8, 1994, setting the stage for the final passage of the
embattled law.297
The Directive's stated objective is to harmonize national laws
regarding packaging and packaging waste to provide a high level of
environmental protection and to ensure the minimization of trade
obstacles resulting from individual national laws on packaging
waste.298 It applies to "all packaging placed on the market in the
Community and all packaging waste, whether it is used or released
at industrial, commercial, office, shop,
service, household or any other level regardless of the material
used.
,299
The Directive requires Member States to adopt measures to en-
sure the prevention of packaging waste and allows, but does not re-
quire, the adoption of measures to encourage the reuse of packaging
materials.3" The Directive also requires states to pass legislation
aimed at attaining the target levels of recycling designated in the
Directive. 0
Article 6 of the Directive requires that, within five years of the
293. Id.
294. Council of Ministers Press Release, RAPID, Dec. 15, 1994.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Council Directive, supra note 1, art. 1, O.J. L 365/10, at 12.
299. Id. art. 2, O.J. L 365/10, at 12.
300. Id. art. 4-5, O.J. L 365/10, at 13.
301. Id. art. 6, O.J. L 365/10, at 13-14.
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implementation date of the Directive, between 50% and 65% of
packaging waste by weight be recovered, and between 25% and
45% of materials contained in packaging waste be recycled, with a
minimum of 15% by weight for each material." 2 The range of the
targets reflect the compromise that was required between the Mem-
ber States to pass the legislation. The Directive also requires that
within ten years of the Directive's implementation date, a substan-
tially increased target for recovery and recycling, as determined by
the Council, be established. °3
Article 7 provides for the development of a return, collection, and
recovery system.3" Each State is given the latitude to create a
framework compatible with the nation's existing waste management
system." One commentator, however, has stated that few will
pursue the German approach of a duplicate waste collection sys-
tem.
306
The Directive also provides for the preparation of a packaging
identification system and the promotion of standards relating to
packaging content, recycling methods, and life-cycle analysis.
30 7
Member States are required to create databases on the magnitude,
characteristics, and evolution of packaging and packaging waste
flows. 308 Measures must also be taken to provide information on
packaging and packaging waste to consumers."
Limitations on a Member State's ability to control packaging and
packaging waste are found in Articles 6 and 18. Article 18 prohibits
the Member States from impeding the movement of goods that
meet the requirements of the Directive throughout the Communi-
ty.310 Article 6 requires that any Member State having or develop-
ing programs with targets higher than the Directive's requirements
must inform the Commission.' Higher standards are only permit-
302. Id. art. 6, O.J. L 365/10, at 14.
303. Id.
304. Id. art. 7, O.J. L 365/10, at 14.
305. Id.
306. European Rubbish; Tied up in Knots, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 1995, at 62.
307. Council Directive 94/62, supra note 1, art. 12, O.J. L 365/10, at 16.
308. Id.
309. Id. art. 13, O.J. L 365/10, at 16.
310. Id. art. 18, O.J. L 365/10, at 17.
311. Id. art. 6, O.J. L 365/10, at 14.
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ted if the "measures avoid distortions of the internal market and do
not hinder compliance by other Member States with the Direc-
tive. 312 This means that those Member States wishing to maintain
higher recovery and recycling targets must have sufficient recycling
capacity within the State's own territory to process the larger quan-
tities of material." 3 Given current German standards, which estab-
lish recovery and recycling targets that far exceed recycling capaci-
ty, this is a critical requirement." 4
The German Environment Minister claimed the Directive's tar-
gets were not high enough to provide an incentive to develop recy-
cling capabilities and comprehensive waste management sys-
tems.3"5 Denmark, The Netherlands, and Germany voted against
the Directive for not being ambitious enough. Others have negative-
ly commented on the Directive's lack of agreement on a common
form of marking or labeling. 6 Annex I to the Directive details a
numeric identification system.317 However, Article 8, which re-
lates to marking and identification systems, merely provides that
the Council will decide on package marking within two years of the
Directive's effective date. 18 The Member States that presently
have packaging waste legislation and those States that pass legis-
312. Id.
313. The Directive states that "Member States which have, or will, set
programmes going beyond the targets of paragraph l(a) and (b) and which pro-
vide to this effect appropriate capacities for recycling and recovery, are permitted
to pursue those targets in the interest of a high level of environmental protection,
on the condition that these measures avoid distortions of the internal market and
do not hinder compliance by other Member States with the Directive." Id. This
has been interpreted by several commentators to require the domestic technologi-
cal capability to recycle the increased amount of waste provided for by the higher
standards. See Packaging Waste: Directive No More Than a Stage, Claims Lead-
ing European Specialist, EUROP. ENV'T, Jan 10, 1995; EU: Industry Delight at
EU Packaging Agreement, CHEM. Bus. NEWS BASE (REUTERS), Feb. 11, 1995.
314. For a discussion of German recycling capacity for specific materials, see
FISHBEIN, supra note 193, at 55-58.
315. Federal Government to Amend Targets Set Under Recycling Ordinance,
Ministry Says, 18 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 4, 140 (Feb. 22, 1995).
316. Packaging Waste: Directive No More Than a Stage, Claims Leading
European Specialist, supra note 313.
317. Council Directive 94/62, supra note 1, at Annex I.
318. Id. art. 8.
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lation in response to the Directive will potentially have either dif-
ferent package markings or similar markings with varying mean-
ings. 1
9
The Member States have until June 30, 1996, to implement na-
tional legislation that complies with the requirements of the Direc-
tive and five years to meet the Directive's obligations.3 20 Germany
will be forced to down-grade its recovery and recycling targets un-
less it develops the domestic recycling capacity to process the col-
lected waste within the Directive's five year time frame. If the Ger-
man government cannot prove to the Commission that its legisla-
tion will not adversely impact the environment and other Member
States' ability to fulfill their obligations under the Directive, Ger-
many will be obligated to amend its Ordinance.
The French Decree, like the German Ordinance, has recovery
rates that are higher than the levels adopted in the Directive. How-
ever, unlike the German Ordinance, the Decree's target rates are
only slightly above the maximum level established by the Coun-
cil.321 The French Decree's lower rates and its authorization of
incineration make it likely that the Commission will find that the
Decree complies with the Directive's requirements.
The Dutch Covenant, however, must be written into law for the
Dutch government to be in compliance with the Directive. 22 Leg-
islation must be adopted that applies to all packaging and packag-
ing waste placed on the Dutch market before the 1996 compliance
date.323 The recovery rates in the Covenant, like the German lev-
els, are substantially higher than levels adopted at the Community
level. 2 ' The Covenant's authorization of incineration of a percent-
319. Packaging Waste: Directive No More Than a Stage, Claims Leading
European Specialist, supra note 313. Packaging specialist Jean-Pierre Hannequart
provides the example of Belgium where Green Dots from Germany and France
and Fost Plus initials all have different obligations associated with the labels. Id.
320. Article 22, paragraph 1 sets the implementation date for national laws.
Council Directive 94/62, supra note 1, at art. 22, para. 1, O.J. L 365/10, at 17.
Article 6, paragraph 1, section (a) sets the time frame for the recovery and recy-
cling standards to be met. Id. at art. 6, para. 1.
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322. See id.
323. See id.
324. See id.
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age of the waste recovered may, however, minimize the impact on
other Member States.
Additionally, the remaining Members of the European Union that
have no such legislation will be required to adopt laws mandating
the recovery and recycling of packaging waste. With all fifteen
Member States regulating packaging waste, less waste will be pro-
duced as manufacturers eliminate unnecessary packaging material.
Consequently, a smaller percentage of the packaging material that
remains waste will be sent to landfills as the recycling targets are
met.
CONCLUSION
The European Packaging Directive will result in less waste and,
perhaps, in a better environment throughout the Union. Within the
coming year, the Member Countries that have yet to regulate pack-
aging waste will be forced to adopt legislation to comply with the
Directive. Ideally, by 1996, there will be fifteen countries with
recovery and recycling legislation, as opposed to the current three.
Germany is no longer the exclusive packaging waste regulator
and soon will be merely one of many. In light of the new Directive,
the German government will either have to find a way to make the
existing Ordinance work without disrupting the European market or
will be forced to lower its standards to the Directive's level. Either
way, the end result will remain the same: less packaging waste
going to landfills, but not at the expense of environmental quality
in countries throughout the E.U. and Eastern Europe.
The imposition of less stringent national standards by a regional
or international regime can, in some cases, actually foster improved
environmental quality. By forcing nations with particularly stringent
standards to relax them, the regional or international regime reduces
the incentive of economic actors to export pollution rather than bear
the high costs of the stringent national standards.
It can be argued that it is not the stringency of Germany's stan-
dards that creates the export problem, but the combination of lax
enforcement of waste export restrictions combined with lax waste
standards in receiving countries. However, there are technical limits
to Germany's ability to recycle its own waste. It is the high Ger-
man recycling targets combined with a lack of domestic technical
capacity that has created the incentive to export in this situation.
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The incentive to export created by Germany's lack of technical
capacity is the reason that the European Union Directive's limita-
tion on maintaining higher standards does not unjustly restrict
Germany's sovereign right to determine its own level of environ-
mental quality. If Germany can prove it has developed the technical
capacity to recycle the waste that its Ordinance requires, the gov-
ernment may retain its high standards. If not, the incentive to ex-
port the waste problem remains, and Germany must forego its high-
er targets for the regional standards set by the Directive.
Packaging waste regulation may be atypical of the traditional
transboundary pollutants in that waste and its pollution are easily
exported. Other pollutants, such as air pollution or water pollution,
are not as easily exported. The creation of air pollution degrades all
air quality, so that any local or regional reduction in air pollutant
emissions is an asset to the region. Therefore, even very strict na-
tional standards will not have any additional adverse impact on
environmental quality. However, packaging waste can be created
nationally and exported, thus improving the quality of the environ-
ment in one state while working to degrade the environment in
another.
As previous American and European experiences have shown,
federalization of environmental laws can ultimately result in im-
proved regional environmental quality. Strict national standards on
transboundary pollutants, such as air pollution and water pollution,
are warranted. However, environmental quality can also be im-
proved when more stringent national standards that create econom-
ic, political, or technical incentives to export pollution problems are
replaced with legislation that removes such incentives.
This same analysis can apply in other federal, regional, or inter-
national regimes such as NAFTA or GATT (now the World Trade
Organization). All national environmental standards, however strin-
gent, can be valid so long as they are economically and technologi-
cally capable of being attained. If, however, they create substantial
incentives to export pollution problems, they can be viewed as
barriers to trade.
Whether or not Germany is forced to lower its recycling targets
remains to be seen. However, the country will likely see the tangi-
ble benefits of the Directive within its own borders and, unques-
tionably, throughout the European region.
